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International Security Presence 




In this article I will examine the powers and activities of NATO-led Kosovo forces (KFOR) and their 
impact on human rights protection in Kosovo. Through this examination, I seek to answer the 
following questions: which KFOR actions affected the human rights of Kosovars? Does KFOR carry 
out responsibilities and abide by the obligations normally imposed upon nation-states? And is there 
a solution available when the alleged violator is KFOR? KFOR is responsible for carrying out military 
tasks and for ‘shouldering’ UNMIK and local security forces in some civilian peace-building tasks. In 
the course of the exercise of its mandate, there were alleged complaints of human rights violations 
by KFOR. The legal implications of these alleged complaints against KFOR (in)actions will also be 
discussed.
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Introduction
In June 1999, after a 78-day NATO military campaign over Yugoslavia, the 
United Nations established the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). 
Under the vast authorities of the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (SRSG), UNMIK remains unprecedented in both its scope and 
its structural complexity (Murphy 2005: 9). Unlike many other previous UN 
missions, UNMIK was formally divided into civilian and military components. 
The international civil component was mandated “to provide an interim 
administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo could enjoy 
substantial autonomy” (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 
1999: 10). The NATO-led Kosovo security forces, known as KFOR, were 
responsible for “carrying out military tasks” and “shouldering” UNMIK in 
civilian peace-building tasks (United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1244 1999: 9). Initially, the establishment of an international security force 
in Kosovo was discussed during the NATO air campaign over the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) by the G8 foreign ministers (CNN 1999; 
Youngs et al. 1999: 61). Its establishment was legalized through adoption 
of the so-called peace plan by the FRY authorities on 3 June 1999 (United 
Nations Security Council Peace Plan 1999). The peace plan provided for 
the establishment of an “international security force under UN auspices 
with substantial NATO participation under unified command and control” 
(United Nations Security Council Peace Plan 1999: 3–4). The peace plan 
was reaffirmed in the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) concluded 
between the FRY and the International Security Force on 9 June 1999 
(Military Technical Agreement 1999). 
The scope of KFOR authorities included “the authority to take all necessary 
action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of 
Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission” (Military Technical Agreement 
1999: sec. 2). The KFOR mission and its broad authority were vested in the 
Commander of the International Security Force (COMCFOR). COMCFOR 
had the authority “without interference or permission to do all that he 
judges necessary and proper including the use of military force, to protect 
the international security force, the international civil presence and to carry 
out the responsibilities as provided in MTA” (Military Technical Agreement 
1999: Appendix B). Even though the MTA provided that “the parties to the 
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agreement will agree on a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) through 
a bilateral agreement” (Military Technical Agreement 1999: Appendix B, 
sec. 3), the legal status of KFOR was regulated unilaterally. KFOR did not 
negotiate with the FRY on a SOFA because it wanted “politically to isolate 
the Belgrade regime” and “it did not want to conclude international 
agreements with the FRY which if concluded would have inhibited the 
competence of the UN-led civil mission” (Zwanenburg 2005: 46). Instead, 
the principles under which KFOR would function (i.e. its rights and duties) 
were regulated by the Interim Status of Forces Policy promulgated by 
the Commander of KFOR in 1999, which was replaced by a common 
declaration by KFOR and UNMIK and promulgated as UNMIK Regulation 
2000/47. In essence, UNMIK Regulation 2000/47 substituted a SOFA as 
the necessary legal instrument to provide special freedoms, privileges 
and duties and enable KFOR to carry out its mandate. Although UN SCR 
1244 made the civilian and military components equal partners (United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 1999: 17), KFOR was not subject 
to oversight by the UN Secretary General or his Special Representative 
(SRSG) in Kosovo. MTA provided that KFOR would “deploy and operate 
without hindrance within Kosovo and with the authority to take all 
necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all 
citizens of Kosovo including arrest and detention of persons who might 
interfere with mission accomplishments” (Military Technical Agreement 
1999: Annex B. 1). This KFOR mandate, combined with broad authorities 
vested in its Commander, the specific measures taken on the ground 
and KFOR’s lack of liability, is in contravention of international human 
rights standards. With the declaration of Kosovo’s independence on 
17 February 2008, UNMIK authorities were reconfigured (United Nations 
Security Council Secretary General’s Report on the United Nations’ 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 2008). KFOR was still mandated 
with securing peace and security in Kosovo under UNSC Resolution 1244. 
Since June 2008, NATO has implemented additional tasks in Kosovo: it has 
assisted in the standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), and 
supported the establishment of the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) and the 
civilian structure to oversee the KSF.
Despite the changes to the political status of Kosovo, KFOR actions that 
have affected human rights still remain a debated issue. In the following 
sections, I will analyse KFOR command and control as a structural matter 
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and its impact on KFOR performance in realizing its mandate as provided 
in UN SCR 1244. Then I will discuss certain actions undertaken by KFOR in 
accordance with its mandate and their human rights implications. The 
issue of attribution of wrongful conduct as it is defined by the International 
Law Commission (ILC) and application of international human rights 
standards to KFOR based on the concept of extraterritoriality will be 
analysed in order to identify a possible mechanism with jurisdiction over 
KFOR member states. Finally, I will discuss the reasoning of the European 
Court of Human Rights on two applications brought by Kosovars against the 
nation states of troop contributing forces, Behrami v. France and Saramati 
v. France, Germany and Norway, and examine how all the mentioned 
issues have been considered by the Court. The paper will conclude 
with a recommendation for the necessity to establish a mechanism for 
remedying the human rights violations resulting from KFOR (in)actions.
Command and control of KFOR 
Although UN SC Resolution 1244 was the legal base for its establishment, 
KFOR was not subject to the UN Secretary General or to UNMIK Special 
Representative of Secretary General (SRSG). The cooperation between 
UNMIK and KFOR on the ground is very interrelated, but never reflected 
on the issue of command and control, UNMIK apparently “coordinates” 
with but does not control KFOR (Amnesty International 2004a: 9). The 
first SRSG Bernard Kouchner presented the “relationship as the head 
of the UNMIK administration and the KFOR commander as being twin 
brothers” (Kouchner 2001). KFOR specific command and control was 
described as a state that “does not amount to the required democratic 
control over the armed forces” and there were calls for UN SCR 1244 
“to be interpreted in conformity with the essential requirement of 
democracy according to which the military is subject to civilian control” 
(Council of Europe 2002: 21). Traditionally, command is defined as “the 
legal authority to issue orders and to compel to obedience” (Eccles 
1965: 118–119). Control is “the process through which a commander, 
assisted by staff, organizes, directs and co-ordinates activities of the 
assigned force in a given territory” (Murphy 2005: 121). In operational 
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terms, command and control processes provide for “organization and 
management of daily operations to implement the given mandate” 
(Murphy 2005: 121–22). In the case of KFOR, daily operations would be 
activities for ensuring public safety and, with it, protection of human 
rights as assigned to by UN SCR 1244. KFOR forces operated under the 
KFOR Commander, who was appointed by NATO through a “unified 
control and command” (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations 2008: Chapter 7). The “unified control and command” 
is in line with all other UN authorized peacekeeping forces that have 
different components — civil, military and police — and that comprise 
different military contingents provided by the troop-contributing states 
(ibid.). KFOR forces were to be “responsible to the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Allied Forces, Southern Europe” (CINCSOUTH) (Zwanenburg 2005). 
On the ground, “the multinational command did not extend to the 
administrative control over contingents or to personnel management” 
(European Commission for Democracy through Law 2004). The 
administrative control was instead “regulated with the national laws and 
policies of each contingent, which differed widely from one state to the 
other” (Murphy 2007: 158–173). This actual control is known as the “red 
card procedure”, giving the contingents “the right not to take orders if 
such orders would contradict their national policy” (Cerone 2001: 486) 
or, as is the case with some forces (i.e. Canadian forces), where the 
national command cannot be handed over to a foreign commander 
at any time (Murphy 2005: 106–107). In the case of KFOR operations, this 
form of command posed challenges, as KFOR was composed of military 
contingents contributed by 35 NATO members and non-NATO members 
(European Commission for Democracy through Law 2004: 5). On the 
ground, this meant that each contingent in the course of exercising 
their daily operations applied its own rules of engagement (ROE) and 
standard operating procedures (SOP) (Spillmann et. al. 2001: 148). During 
waves of ethnic violence in Kosovo, “KFOR response to crowd and riot 
control operations was thus chaotic and the protection of the minority 
communities was catastrophic” (International Crisis Group 2004). In 
general, crowd and riot control operations aim to suppress outbreaks 
of violence, in particular ethnically and religiously motivated violence, 
and thus ultimately aim to prevent upheavals from crossing the threshold 
into internal armed conflict. These operations play a particular role in 
the protection of designated people and the defence of property with 
designated special status (PDSS). In Kosovo, the designated people 
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referred to minority communities like the Albanians or Serbs in a given 
area, and PDSS referred to their property and their cultural heritage. It 
has been stated that several times “KFOR failed to respond to the security 
problems in Kosovo and with it failed to protect minorities because of the 
lack of a unified command for all KFOR sectors in implementing KFOR 
unified policy on responding to public order situations” (Human Rights 
Watch 2004).
KFOR activities in Kosovo and human rights 
implications
In the first years of administration, UNMIK and KFOR were faced with 
a volatile security situation that required a quick response. KFOR had 
to undertake policing activities over the entire territory of Kosovo until 
the international civilian police established capacities to take on full 
responsibilities. On the ground, KFOR had not only the role of civilian 
police, arresting and detaining ex- and would-be belligerents suspected 
of committing war crimes, murder, attempted murder, rape, weapon 
offences and other serious crimes, but also conducted so-called 
operational detentions, ran local prisons, controlled traffic and assisted 
refugees in Kosovo. KFOR had to engage daily in riot control operations 
in order to keep hostile ethnic groups from clashing violently. KFOR still 
continued to shoulder the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) during interethnic 
unrests, particularly in the ethnically divided town of Mitrovica. While 
carrying out its duties, KFOR was criticized for failure to ensure security 
for minorities, failure to secure peaceful enjoyment of property, arbitrary 
arrests and unlawful detention, ill treatment of detainees, denial of 
detainee rights and lack of KFOR accountability (Amnesty International 
2000; Human Rights Watch 2004; International Crises Group 2004). It is 
beyond the scope of this article to analyse in detail all the mentioned 
allegations. The following section will discuss the so-called COMCFOR 
detentions and their effects on the individual’s rights. 
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COMKFOR detentions 
International organizations and advisory bodies (European Commission for 
Democracy through Law 2004; Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe 2002), international NGOs (Amnesty International 2004a, 
Amnesty International 2004b, Human Rights Watch 2004) and scholars 
(Cerone 2000; Marshall and Inglis 2003; De Wet 2004; Zwanenburg 2005; 
Direk 2015) have discussed the legality and human rights implications of 
KFOR detentions under KFOR command. These detentions were based 
on Detention Directive 42, which allowed “the head of KFOR to authorize 
detentions for long periods without judicial authorization or any recourse 
to judicial review” (European Parliament DG Information 2001). In 2002, 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission in Kosovo 
(OMIK) reported “on the basis of information received from KFOR that an 
average of 10 persons each month were held under the Multinational 
Brigade Commander’s authority, based on Directive 42” (Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 2002). The detainees under Directive 
42 involved “criminal offenders; individuals that pose threat to peace 
and security; persons suspected for different offences; and persons under 
judicial detention” (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
2002; Joseph 2003; Marshall and Inglis 2003: 15). The main human rights 
implications of COMCFOR detentions by order of the KFOR Commander 
involve the exercise of authority without judicial review and adverse 
effects on the right of access to court. COMCFOR detentions also affected 
the liberty of the person and freedom of movement. OSCE, as the UNMIK 
human rights component, and international human rights groups have 
heavily criticized COMKFOR detentions for “being in contravention of 
international laws and the applicable law in Kosovo” (Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 2002; United Nations Human Rights 
Committee 2004). “These detentions are being carried out by military 
forces and are not based on a decision by a competent judiciary, and 
they do not allow for judicial or any civilian oversight” (Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 2002; United Nations Human Rights 
Committee 2004). Moreover, there was no possibility for detainees to 
challenge the legality of their detention (UNMIK Reg. 2000/47 2000). 
Promotion and protection of human rights was one of the main tasks 
of UNMIK (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 1999: sec.j). 
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UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, amended by UNMIK Regulation 2000/59, 
on the applicable law in Kosovo guaranteed the application of major 
human rights treaties, including “….human rights standards contained in 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights […], European Convention on 
Human Rights […], the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
[…], the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
[…], the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
[…], the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women […], the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment [ ] and the International Convention 
on the Rights of the Child” (UNMIK Reg. 2000/59 2000: sec.1). Section 
3(5) of UNMIK Regulation 2000/47 obliged “UNMIK personnel to respect 
the laws of Kosovo and to refrain from any action incompatible with the 
applicable laws” (UNMIK/Reg. 2000/47 2000).
Scholars infer that KFOR was bound to respect the applicable law of 
Kosovo while exercising law enforcement activities, since this obligation 
stems from the Charter itself and binds UN organizations when undertaking 
the civil administration of a territory regardless of a resolution or regulation 
to this effect (Cerone 2000; Marshall and Inglis 2003; De Wet 2004; Benedek 
2005; Zwanenburg 2005; Direk 2015). In addition, it has been argued that 
human rights obligations apply to KFOR (and UNMIK) based on territorial 
control of KFOR-contributing states over the beneficiaries of rights (Cerone 
2001: 418). The relevant NATO operation plans (OPLANs), directives, and 
standing operating procedures (SOPs) for the peacekeeping forces in the 
Balkans required “compliance either explicitly or implicitly with the spirit of 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and respect for Human Rights Law 
(HRL) in the course of the operations they govern” (European Commission 
for Democracy through Law 2004). Also, the authorization granted to KFOR 
in Resolution 1244 to participate in the civil administration implies that the 
countries acting on behalf of the SC would act in accordance with human 
rights norms (United Nations Security Council Report Secretary General’s 
Report on the United Nations’ Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 1999; 
UNMIK Reg. 1999/24 1999: Art. 1). KFOR would therefore be required “to 
act in accordance with the basic human rights norms when engaged in 
policing and other civil activities, as opposed to military combat” (De Wet 
2004: 321). However, UNMIK provided that “KFOR shall respect applicable 
law that provides for international human rights norms and UNMIK 
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Regulations only insofar as they do not conflict with the fulfilment of the 
mandate given under SC Resolution 1244” (UNMIK Reg. 2000/47 2000: sec. 
2, para. 2). Moreover, UNMIK Regulation 200/47 granted immunity from 
jurisdiction to UNMIK and KFOR, and “thus from the very beginning there 
were no mechanisms to challenge KFOR’s activities that were in breach of 
human rights standards in Kosovo” (De Wet 2004: 321).
Attribution of KFOR actions to NATO, UNMIK or 
contributing states?
There is a general acceptance of the stance that international organizations 
possess legal personality (International Court of Justice 1949). However, 
there is no common consensus on the legal personality of peacekeeping 
operations. In its commentary on the draft Article 13 concerning the 
responsibility for atrocities of international organizations, the International 
Law Commission (ILC) presented the KFOR and UNMIK relationship as 
an “example of two international organizations allegedly exercising 
direction and control in the commission of a wrongful act” (United Nations 
International Law Commission 2005: para. 27). The ILC further reinforced 
its presentation on KFOR by quoting the French Government’s Preliminary 
Objections to the Legality of Use of Force, which submitted that “NATO is 
responsible for the direction of KFOR and the United Nations for ‘control’ 
of it” (Serbia and Montenegro v. France 2004). However, the fact that 
UNMIK had no operational authority over KFOR is evident from UN SCR 
1244, from UNMIK Regulation 2000/47, and from the assertions of NATO 
authorities. KFOR General Reinhardt stated categorically that “UNMIK 
has neither legal jurisdiction nor mandate to conduct investigations into 
KFOR activities’’ (Amnesty International 2000). The UN authority over KFOR 
is limited only to the requirement of receiving and evaluating reports 
by “the leaderships of the international civil and security presences”, 
as provided in UN SC Resolution 1244 (United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1244 1999: para. 20). It has been submitted that international 
peacekeeping operations are not subjects of international law in their own 
right; rather, “they form part of the organizational framework of their lead 
organizations” (Clapham 2006: 148–151). From the consolidated United 
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Nations practice, UN peacekeeping operations are subsidiary organs to 
the organization. Although NATO has not made an express statement of a 
similar nature, by the fact that NATO de facto integrated respective force 
headquarters into its headquarters structure, it is acceptable to assume 
that NATO peacekeeping operations have been considered subsidiary 
organs of NATO. On this basis, the conduct of KFOR could be attributed 
to NATO as the leading organization. However, the issue of attribution of 
wrongful conduct has not been explicitly clarified in the legal documents 
establishing KFOR and UNMIK. Therefore, for quite a long time the issue 
of jurisdiction over the wrongful acts committed by KFOR troops has 
remained in interplay between the attribution of conduct to NATO as 
the lead organization and the jurisdiction of the troop-contributing state 
contingents of KFOR. The issue of attribution of acts to UNMIK and KFOR 
was interpreted only in 2007 by the European Court in two cases brought 
by Kosovo citizens, to be discussed in the sections below.
The principle of extraterritorial application of 
international human rights and its applicability to 
KFOR 
Scholars and practitioners have presented different modalities of the 
application of human rights and humanitarian law to KFOR. The most 
supportive modality remains the extraterritorial application of human rights 
standards to KFOR activities in Kosovo based on relevant states’ extraterritorial 
conduct (Cerone 2001; Knoll 2006; Stahn 2001). In international law, it is 
hard to identify a clear rule that provides for invoking the extraterritorial 
criteria. Also, there are no clear legal provisions for defining the state’s 
human rights obligations when it acts abroad on its own initiative or as a 
peacekeeping force under the UN umbrella. In discussing the discomfort 
of the “powers of international technocrats”, Hafner points out that 
“international organizations could be used by the states as a device to 
avoid responsibility and accountability by transferring the decision-making 
competencies to the organization and question the extent of international 
organizations being bound by the rule of law” (Hafner 2005: 36). 
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The notion of ‘applicability’ of human rights standards over international 
military troops is to a certain extent codified and interpreted by international 
supervisory mechanisms. However, the issue of “effective implementation 
of the human rights standards and supervision by an international 
supervisory mechanism remains very incoherent in the absence of a 
coherent analytical framework” (Cerone 2006). All major human rights 
treaties to which NATO member states are parties require states not only 
to secure but also to establish mechanisms for human rights protection 
of individuals within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction. The UN 
Human Rights Committee has consistently held that “a state’s jurisdiction 
extends beyond territorial boundaries interpreting the scope of Article 2(1)” 
and that it “does not imply that the State party concerned cannot be held 
accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant which its agents 
commit upon the territory of another State, whether the acquiescence 
of the Government of that State or in opposition to it” (Burgos/Delia 
Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay 1981). Also, in its General Comment No. 3.1, 
the UN Human Rights Committee stated that “a State party must respect 
and ensure the rights laid down in the [1966 UN] Covenant [on Civil and 
Political Rights] to anyone within the power of effective control of that 
State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party” 
(United Nations Human Rights Committee 2004). Furthermore, the Human 
Rights Committee affirmed that “enjoyment of the Covenant Rights is not 
necessarily limited to citizens of State parties but must also be available 
to all individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, such as asylum 
seekers, refugees, migrant workers and other persons who may find 
themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the state Party.” 
The Human Rights Committee affirmed that “this principle also covers the 
subjects of the State Party that exercise power or effective control while 
acting outside its territory, despite circumstances in which such power 
and effective control is established, such as forces constituting a national 
contingent of a state Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or 
peace enforcement operation” (United Nations Human Rights Committee 
2004). Application of the rights contained in ICCPR in the contexts of 
military occupation has been confirmed also by the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ). In its Advisory Opinion in 2004 on Legal Consequences 
on the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the 
ICJ established that “the ICCPR, the International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC) applied to the conduct of the Israeli forces in the 
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Occupied Territories” (International Court of Justice 2004: paras. 100–109). 
However, in this opinion the ICJ narrowed application of the ICCPR to the 
“acts done […] in the exercise of its jurisdiction by the occupation forces” 
(International Court of Justice 2004: paras. 109–111). 
The European Convention, in its Article 1, provides that a state is 
“responsible for securing the enjoyment of the rights contained in the 
ECHR for everyone within that state’s jurisdiction” (Council of Europe 
1950: Article 1). The case law of the European Court for Human Rights has 
interpreted ‘state jurisdiction’ through different standards when assessing 
whether individuals alleging human rights violations actually fell within the 
state jurisdiction. The concept of state jurisdiction has been interpreted 
by the European Court to include cases where representatives of a state 
have exercised effective control (Cyprus v. Turkey 2001). Also, it may 
include activities of state agents in territories outside the normal borders 
of a state party (Abdullah Öcalan v. Turkey 2005) or/and when state 
representatives are operating internationally (Bankovic v. Belgium 2001). 
As such, in order for an individual to enjoy the human rights protections 
that the Convention guarantees, “a victim of a violation must be found to 
have been at the relevant time within the jurisdiction of the State Party” 
allegedly violating his or her rights (Al-Skeini and Others v. Secretary of 
State for Defence 2007). This is a very high standard to meet considering 
the authorization of current and past peace-keeping international 
missions, their troop deployment and their operation on the ground. The 
composition of the peace-keeping forces — the civilian or military forces 
— is usually multinational, operating jointly (joint operation is provided at 
least in the legal documents establishing them); their operation on the 
ground is also linked with the national rules of engagement (ROE). Often 
territories where they operate are not legally defined (i.e. refugee camps, 
territories between borders) which render the peace-keeping forces’ (in)
actions unaccountable.
Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and 
Norway 
The two cases Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and 
Norway brought by two Kosovars to the European Court have drawn wide-
reaching attention to the laws of international responsibility and to the 
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issue of delegation of powers and attribution of conduct over states when 
they act jointly in peace-keeping missions. Due to the lack of jurisdiction 
of national courts based on KFOR privileges and immunities (UNMIK Reg. 
2000/47 2000), the two cases were directed to the European Court in 2000. 
The two applicants complained about the “failure of the troop contributing 
states to act in accordance with the human rights standards contained 
in the European Convention” (Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway 
2007). On 15 November 2006, the Grand Chamber jointly heard the two 
applications, even though the two cases dealt with different alleged 
violations arising from different KFOR responsibilities. The applicant — the 
father of the victims — in Behrami v. France was complaining about the 
violation of the right to life (Article 2 of the ECHR) due to the death of his 
twelve-year son and injury of his other ten-year son by the undetonated 
cluster bombs dropped during the NATO air campaign. The incident took 
place in the Mitrovica region, which was under KFOR multinational brigades 
under French authority. It is relevant here to mention that NATO divided 
KFOR into four multinational brigades (MNB): France, Germany, USA and 
United Kingdom brigades, each responsible for ensuring the security of a 
specific region of Kosovo. In Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway 
the applicant, Mr. Saramati, challenged the legality of his detention under 
COMKFOR Directive 42, basing his application on violation of the right to 
liberty and security (Article 5 ECHR). Mr. Saramati was also complaining 
that he had no effective remedy available against KFOR (Article 13 ECHR), 
and that his right to a fair trial had been violated (Article 6, para. 1 ECHR). 
In Behrami v. France, the applicant argued that the only authority in the 
region of Mitrovica mandated to secure the safety of the inhabitants, 
who were actually refugees returning after the 1999 conflict, were French 
troops. Despite notification by the local inhabitants about the existence of 
cluster bombs, the French KFOR took no steps to remove them; they did 
not notify the local inhabitants on the dangers of the cluster bombs, or 
fence off or mark the area (Behrami v. France 2007, para. 6). 
In the case of Saramati v. France, German, and Norway, the applicant was 
one of many Kosovars detained on the order of the KFOR Commanders 
(first Norwegian and then French). It is to be noted here that the applicant 
latter withdrew the complaint against Germany. He was held for six months 
without any legal basis or judicial oversight (Saramati v. France, Germany 
and Norway 2007). Mr. Saramati was a Commander of a Kosovo Protection 
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Corps Brigade operating under UNMIK police authority. He was held in 
detention based on grounded allegations of committing criminal acts 
from 17 September 2001 to 23 January 2002, although the Supreme 
Court of Kosovo had ordered his release in June 2001. In the Behrami 
case, the French authorities submitted their rebuttal, arguing that KFOR 
was an international structure established under and only responsible 
to the United Nations (Behrami v. France 2007: para. 68): as such, it was 
the UN and not France that had effective authority over the territory of 
Kosovo. French authorities also submitted that the case did not fall within 
the jurisdiction of Article 1 of the ECHR since the incident did not occur in 
the territory of France (ibid.: para. 67). In the case of Saramati v. France, 
Germany and Norway, the three governments and the UN provided 
comments. Six other European countries provided their standing to the 
European Court opposing the application of the European Convention 
standards to military operations out of the country (Behrami v. France 
2007; Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway 2007: paras. 91–120).
The reasoning of the European Court on Behrami v. France 
and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway
Since its foundation, the European Court has succeeded in establishing 
itself as a leader in international mechanisms for human rights protection. 
Through its case law, the European Court guides states in the protection 
and promotion of individuals’ rights, and through its reasoning and 
interpretations has enhanced and reshaped international human rights 
law. The applications in Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, 
Germany and Norway provided the Court with a unique opportunity 
to further contribute to the already much debated issue of the 
accountability of international organizations and their troop-contributing 
states (United Nations International Law Commission 2004; United Nations 
International Law Commission 2011). However, the reasoning of the Court 
on the admissibility decision of both cases came as a surprise to the legal 
community in Kosovo, to international scholars and above all to the citizens 
of Kosovo. Contrary to its previous interpretations of “territorial jurisdiction” 
(ECHR Article 1), and “effective control” (Loizidou v. Turkey 1995), the 
Court focused on analysing its jurisdictional ratione personae over the 
cases. Here the Court undertook to “review the acts of the respondent 
States carried out on behalf of the UN and, more generally, as to the 
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relationship between the Convention and the UN acting under Chapter 
VII of its Charter” (Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany 
and Norway 2007: para. 146). In doing so, the Court also considered the 
mandate and legality of the delegation of powers between the two 
international presences, UNMIK and KFOR. In analysing “whether the 
actions and inactions undertaken by KFOR can be attributed to troop 
contributing states”, the European Court “decided by majority that those 
(in)actions derive from UN SR 1244 and with it are attributable to the UN 
and not to members states comprising KFOR” (ibid.: paras. 140–141). 
UNMIK was authorized by the UNSC based on Chapter VII powers and it 
did delegate powers to the KFOR. 
From here, the Court turned to determine the legality of the delegation of 
powers from UNMIK to KFOR. The Court analysed in detail the UNMIK chain 
of command based on its constituent documents and stated that “The 
UNSC was to retain ultimate authority and control over the security mission 
and it delegated to NATO, in consultation with non-NATO member states, 
the power to establish and maintain operational command of KFOR” 
(ibid.: para. 129). The Court maintained that “even though the troop-
contributing nations had some authority over their troops (for reasons, 
inter alia, of safety, discipline and accountability) and certain obligations 
in their regard (for example, material provision), the SC retained ultimate 
authority and control and […] effective command of the relevant 
operation matters was retained by NATO” (ibid. 2007: paras. 138–140). 
This Court’s reasoning might sound convincing in light of the SC political 
decision establishing an UN-mandated security force for Kosovo as “an 
equal international presence” with UNMIK, but NATO-led and de facto 
NATO-commanded operations involved no strategic direction from any 
UN body. Moreover, the MTA that allowed KFOR establishment was signed 
before UN SCR 1244, and SC authorities over KFOR were only limited to the 
regular reports by the officials of the international presence to the UNSC. 
In its further analyses of the responsibilities of UNMIK and KFOR, the Court 
found that “issuing detention orders fell within the security mandate of 
KFOR and that the supervision of de-mining fell within UNMIK’s mandate” 
(ibid.: paras. 122–126). In so doing, with respect to the Behrami case, 
the Court found that it was “KFOR’s failure to secure the site [where the 
detonation had taken place] and provide information thereon to UNMIK” 
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(ibid.: para. 126). Despite KFORs responsibility in relation to demining, 
KFOR was not acting independently in this task; KFOR undertook this task 
on behalf of UNMIK. As such, UNMIK was mandated with demining tasks 
and KFOR’s inaction was attributable to the UN (ibid.: para. 163). The 
Court firmly stated that “given that UNMIK was a subsidiary organ of the 
United Nations and that KFOR was exercising powers lawfully delegated 
under Chapter VII, their actions were directly attributable to the UN, 
an organization of universal jurisdiction fulfilling its imperative collective 
security objective” (ibid.: para. 151). The Court concluded that “in these 
circumstances, the applicants’ complaints were incompatible ratione 
personae with the provisions of the Convention and declared both 
applications inadmissible” (ibid.: para.152).
From the above discussion, it is evident that the European Court’s 
holding that human rights violations resulting from KFOR’s (in)actions 
were attributable to the UN and not to the troop contributing states 
deviated from its own developed standards for attribution of wrongful 
acts. Considering the circumstances of the case, in particular in Behrami 
v. France, if the ‘effective control’ test and territorial jurisdiction had 
been applied as established in its case law, the Court would have 
come to the finding that the failure to demine in the Mitrovica region 
(detention in Saramati) would be attributable to France (Germany 
and Norway). Similarly, if the delegation of the tasks by UNMIK to KFOR 
combined with the ‘effective control’ test had been considered by 
the Court, KFOR’s (in)actions could have been qualified with dual or 
multiple attribution to NATO, the UN and France. Certainly, the reasoning 
of the Court when rejecting the applications on admissibility grounds 
negatively impacted the overall complex human rights situation in 
Kosovo (European Commission for Democracy through Law 2004). By 
concentrating in its analyses on ultimate authority and the control test, 
the legality of transfer of powers and responsibilities from UNMIK to KFOR 
— through interpreting UN SC Resolution 1244 and the UN Charter — the 
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Conclusion
The measures undertaken by KFOR to implement its mandate and authority 
as provided in UN SCR 1244 had adverse effects on nearly all of the rights 
guaranteed in international human rights law and applicable in Kosovo. NATO 
policy and state intervention in its troops’ command and control caused an 
inconsistency in operations which resulted in a failure to protect human rights 
in Kosovo, in particular during KFOR operations to ensure security and quash 
interethnic violence. Infringement of individual rights through COMCFOR 
detention not only affected the individual’s right to liberty and security of the 
person, but also affected the enjoyment of the right to a remedy and the right 
to compensation when the defendant was found not guilty. KFOR activities, 
due to its military strategy and operational level, were covered by broader 
immunities and privileges that practically rendered KFOR unaccountable for its 
actions. KFOR was not operating in a legal vacuum; however, the nonexistence 
of a specific legal framework that provided for the application of human rights 
standards to specific actions of KFOR made Kosovars consider the general 
principles of international law, mainly the extraterritorial application of human 
rights standards. However, the reasoning of the Court on the admissibility 
decision on Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and 
Norway showed that the court relied on the formal hierarchy concerning the 
establishment of KFOR to escape an unfriendly precedent for future peace-
keeping actions; otherwise, in the future, countries would hesitate to contribute 
their troops to international security operations. These two decisions showed 
again that peace-keeping is an essentially political institution and confirmed 
that Kosovars’ right to an effective remedy was compromised when KFOR 
failed to protect human rights in Kosovo. 
It is the standing of this paper that the conflicting issues related to the 
legal bases that establish the international peacekeeping structures and 
the internal operational rules of the troop-contributing forces need to be 
reconsidered. The legal bases for establishing future international security 
forces in international administrations need to allow for the establishment 
of a (non-)judicial mechanism as an integral part of the mission with the 
jurisdiction to handle human rights violations alleged by the inhabitants 
under their authority and provide for a reparation modality mechanism in 
order to respect the right to be compensated. 
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